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Abstract
This paper discusses the phenomenon of Kāpil Maṭh (Madhupur, India), a Sāṃkhyayoga 
āśrama founded in the early twentieth century by the charismatic Bengali scholar-monk Swāmi 
Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya (1869–1947). While referring to Hariharānanda’s writings I will consider the 
idea of the re-establishment of an extinct spiritual lineage. I shall specify the criteria for identity of 
this revived Sāṃkhyayoga tradition by explaining why and on what assumptions the modern reinter-
pretation of this school can be perceived as continuation of the thought of Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. 
The starting point is, however, the question whether it is possible at all to re-establish a philosophical 
tradition which had once broken down and disappeared for centuries. In this context, one ought to 
ponder if it is likely to revitalise the same line of thinking, viewing, philosophy-making and prac-
tice in accordance with the theoretical exposition of the right insight achieved by an accomplished 
teacher, a master, the founder of a “new” revived tradition declared to maintain a particular school 
identity. Moreover, I refer to a monograph of Knut A. Jacobsen (2018) devoted to the tradition of 
Kāpil Maṭh interpreted as a typical product of the nineteenth-century Bengali renaissance.
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Although some of the writings of Swāmi Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya (1869–1947)1 are 
well known and have been discussed among scholars specializing in Indian philosophy, 
1 Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali, aka Patañjala Yoga-darśana – considered to be his magnum opus – 
was originally published in Bengali then in Hindi. During the last years of his life Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya 
asked some Indian and non-Indian scholars to take up the work of rendering it into English. The English 
edition was published in 1963 by the University of Calcutta (cf. Preface to the first edition in: S.H. 
Ᾱraṇya, Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali with Bhāsvatī, trans. P.N. Mukerji, Kolkata 2000, pp. xiii–xiv). 
Since then it has been reprinted several times, revised, and enlarged.
This article is based on research which could not be possible without the long-lasting support of 
a number of persons more or less formally associated with the contemporary tradition of Sāṃkhyayoga 
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he is not commonly recognized as a great modern yoga teacher or as the founder 
of a living tradition, unlike some other Bengali figures of his time such as Swāmi 
Vivekānanda (1863–1902) or Śri Aurobindo (1972–1950). Apparently, the fact that 
he established Kāpil Maṭh, an āśrama dedicated to the legendary sage Kāpila, whose 
members wish to cultivate the strict ancient model of renunciation (saṃnyāsa), did 
not bring him due fame. According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya it was Kāpila, dated to 
the 7th century BCE, who was the first to attain liberating knowledge (mokṣa) and 
establish the worldview of both Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Therefore, both philosophical 
schools are perceived by Hariharānanda as being embedded in one integrated tradi-
tion and their followers are known as Sāṃkhyayogins.2
When did neoclassical Sāṃkhyayoga start?
Presenting the history of Sāṃkhyayoga tradition, Gerald J. Larson points to three 
main historical stages of its development which seem to echo three dimensions of 
meaning in the word sāṃkhya, namely: (a) an enumerated set or grouping (sāṃkhya 
as an adjective); (b) someone who calculates, enumerates, or discriminates properly 
and correctly (sāṃkhya as a masculine noun); (c) and a specific system of dualist 
philosophizing that proceeds by a method of enumerating the contents of experience 
(sāṃkhya as a neuter noun).3 Hence, the three historical phases of Sāṃkhya develop-
ment cover accordingly: (1) the period when Sāṃkhya denotes intellectual inquiry 
and attempts at grouping systematic thinking, which are documented in the oldest 
learned traditions of ancient India (from the Vedic period ca. 1500 BCE through the 
third century BCE); (2) the second period when Sāṃkhya becomes linked to a meth-
odology of reasoning that results in spiritual knowledge leading to liberation from 
the cycle of rebirth (ca. eighth century BCE till the first centuries of the Common 
Era); and (3) the third phase when Sāṃkhya technical philosophical terminology and 
normative formulation is complete and begins to circulate in the form of Yogasūtra 
ascribed to Patañjali (ca. 4th c.), or rather Patañjalayogaśāstra,4 and Sāṃkhyakārikā 
located in Madhupur. I owe my thanks to Swāmi Bhāskara Ᾱraṇya, the current head of Kāpil Maṭh, and 
Professor Arindam Chakrabarti, who helped me contact the Kāpil Maṭh devotees in Kolkata. I am par-
ticularly grateful to Adinath Chatterjee and his son Abhiprasun Chattopadhyay for their continued and 
wholehearted assistance.
An early version of this paper was presented in March 2018 at the conference on “The Sāṁkhya 
System: Accounting For The Real,” organized by Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, USA. 
I also discussed Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s life story and his philosophical contribution to Sāṃkhyayoga 
tradition in my other paper: M. Jakubczak, Why Didn’t Siddhartha Gautama Become a Sāṃkhya 
Philosopher, After All?, [in:] Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue. Self and No-Self, I. Kuznetsova, 
J. Ganeri, Ch. Ram-Prasad (eds.), Farnham 2012, pp. 29–45.
2 Cf. K.A. Jacobsen, Yoga in Modern Hinduism: Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya and Sāṁkhyayoga, London – 
New York 2018, pp. 2–41.
3 Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 4, 
G.J. Larson, R.S. Bhattacharya (eds.), Delhi 1987, pp. 3–41.
4 Cf. P.A. Maas, A Concise Historiography of Classical Yoga Philosophy, [in:] Periodization and 
Historiography of Indian Philosophy, E. Franco (ed.), Vienna 2013, pp. 53–90.
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compiled by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (ca. 5th c.), which are the main texts of the two currents of 
Sāṃkhya that emerged from the common source.
We can label the above stages of the tradition’s development as follows: proto-
Sāṃkhya period, pre-classical Sāṃkhya, and the classical period when Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga gain the status of separate schools. Furthermore, we can distinguish the stage 
labeled as post-classical Sāṃkhyayoga when its text-readings undergo the influence 
of other traditions, especially monistic and theistic currents of Vedānta, as well as the 
tapas tradition of Indian ascetics and the Haṭhayoga tradition. The vedāntic interpre-
tations have been developing since the tenth century and brought about such impor-
tant texts as Tattvasamāsasūtra (14th c.), Sāṃkhyasūtra (15th c.), and some commen-
taries of Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. Although the Haṭhayoga tradition, present 
in India from the eleventh century, differs significantly from the classical Sāṃkhya 
and Yoga, teachers of modern postural yoga have often linked their practices to the 
Yogasūtra, ignoring the fact that this text emerged within a wider Sāṃkhyayoga line-
age. Paradoxically, Sāṃkhya philosophy has not attracted much attention until now, 
even though Yogasūtra attracts millions of readers worldwide. The revival of yoga 
in modern Hinduism and its global popularity, which has been increasing gradually 
since the 1960s, has been predominated by vedāntic and haṭhayogic interpretations 
which usually underestimate the historical context and ignore the philosophically 
relevant background of Patañjalayogaśāstra.
Here, I propose to highlight the fifth stage of the Sāṃkhyayoga tradition initiated 
by Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya, a Bengali philosopher and ascetic, whose interpretations 
remain fully in line with the spirit of classical Sāṃkhya. What makes him unique 
and outstanding among many other modern teachers of yoga is not only his writing, 
which consists of a number of in-depth commentaries written mostly in Sanskrit and 
Bengali, but also the fact that his genuine lifelong practical engagement led to the 
establishment of a small monastery aiming to revive Sāṃkhyayoga as a living philo-
sophical tradition. This new period, which started with the founding of Kāpil Maṭh in 
1924, may be labeled as neoclassical Sāṃkhyayoga.
Thanks to the extraordinary charisma of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya, manifested in his 
involvement in personal meditative and ascetic practice, monastic activity, and philo-
sophical reflection, this tradition, considered extinct for centuries, has been brought 
back to life. Although the renewal movement of the classical Sāṃkhyayoga associ-
ated with the center of Kāpil Maṭh has not gained much popularity in the past century, 
its very existence to this day and the rich legacy of the quasi-classical Hariharānanda’s 
commentaries, successively translated into English and published thanks to the ef-
forts of the Kāpil Maṭh community,5 is a unique socio-philosophical phenomenon, 
and as such should be acknowledged as an example of a living tradition.
5 Some basic information on Sāṃkhyayoga philosophy, the issued publications and on-going 
activities taking place on the Kāpil Maṭh Campus are available on the website: http://kapilmath.com 
[access: 10.02.2020].
108
Who was the founder of Kāpil Maṭh?
Little is known about the life story of the founder of Kāpil Maṭh. Hariharānanda 
Ᾱraṇya was born to a well-off upper caste Bengali family (bhadralok) and started 
his intellectual and spiritual exploration at an early age. He joined the prestigious 
Presidency College in Kolkata, but progressively losing interest in formal education 
he decided to leave before graduation. Soon after, he was to adopt an ascetic life-
style and dedicated himself entirely to the pursuit of liberating knowledge. Patañjali’s 
Yogasūtra was to be an enormous inspiration on his spiritual path. Around 1890 he 
was initiated into saṃnyāsa by Swāmi Trilokī Ᾱraṇya, who was at that time returning 
from a pilgrimage to Gaṅgāsāgar, south of Kolkata, and was maintaining a vow of si-
lence (mauna). Trilokī might have been a Kāpila worshiper, since Kāpila is the main 
divinity worshiped at the Gaṅgāsāgar festival on the island of Sagar. Hariharānanda 
Āraṇya probably never met his guru again. Shortly afterwards he went into complete 
retreat, in the solitary caves of the Barābar Hills near Gaya, in Bihar.6 After 1898 
he returned to live in a monastic society where he continued his meditative practice 
and his studies of the ancient Hindu and Buddhist philosophical texts independently. 
First, he spent some years at a small hermitage in Tribeni, on the bank of the Ganges, 
then he went to Kurseong near Darjeeling. Finally, in 1924 he decided to reside for 
good in Kāpil Maṭh, in Madhupur.
While leading a hermit’s life, Swāmiji continued his spiritual practice and at the 
same time occupied himself with writing. He wrote numerous philosophical com-
mentaries and essays, including Sāṃkhyatattvāloka, an interpretation of the Sāṃkhya 
texts, and Bhāsvatī (alias Yogakārikā), a masterly annotation to Patañjali’s Yogasūtra 
and Yogabhāṣya, and Karmatattva, an insightful explanation of the doctrine of kar-
man.7 Most of his contributions prove the great erudition and philosophical insight 
of a dedicated yogin with a non-sectarian view, and they were written in Sanskrit 
and Bengali. He was able to read Pāli, Sinhalese and Burmese, which was help-
ful while preparing the first rendering of Dhammapada, the collection of the Bud-
dha’s sayings, from Pāli to Sanskrit, and the first Bengali translation of Śāntideva’s 
Bodhicaryāvatāra, a Buddhist manual for the practice of yoga for bodhisattva. Thus, 
to revive Sāṃkhyayoga as a living tradition Āraṇya contributed his own original 
commentaries on the core texts of the tradition. Since his interest was not merely in-
tellectual but spiritual as well, he wanted to test his understanding as self-experience 
by personally following the strict discipline of the renunciant.
His main interest was to rediscover and purify the tradition of yoga and to revital-
ize the original Sāṃkhyayoga philosophical framework of the Yogasūtra. As Jacob-
sen rightly suggests, the modern rebirth of Sāṃkhyayoga represented by Kāpil Maṭh 
was based on the assumption spread in late nineteenth-century Bengal that it was 
Kāpila and not Patañjali who was the originator of the philosophy of Yoga as being 
6 Cf. S.H. Ᾱraṇya, A Unique Travelogue. An Allegorical Exploration of Spirituality and Yoga, trans. 
S. Guha, Madhupur 2001.
7 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, The Doctrine of Karma (Karmatattva). A Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the 
Theory of Karma, trans. I. Guptā, Madhupur 2008.
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a part of the Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition.8 Even though Patañjali has become 
central to modern yoga, and in the nineteenth century was celebrated mostly by Ori-
entalists and proponents of Western Esoterism, he plays no special role in Kāpil Maṭh. 
Moreover, no element of postural yoga is promoted there. Instead, among the eight 
limbs that constitute Patañjali’s yogic practice (aṣṭāṅgayoga) the emphasis is on 
the five restraints (yama), five observances (niyama), and concentration (samādhi), 
while bodily posture (āsana) is understood as just sitting comfortably on the floor in 
the lotus position, and focusing on the breath as a way of calming the mind.
After 1900, Hariharānanda’s writings and conceptions became increasingly popu-
lar, and the aśrama he founded attracted many interested people from all parts of 
India and even abroad. Among them were powerful people, teachers, intellectuals, 
and politicians. However, Hariharānanda was quite aware that Sāṃkhyayoga appeals 
to a relatively small number of people. He emphasized the difficulty of yoga and 
suggested that to attain the goals of yoga one needs to become a saṃnyāsin living 
outside of society. In 1926 he decided to isolate himself even from his students, clos-
ing off the entrance to his artificial cave (guha).9 From 1939 onwards, due to his poor 
health caused by diabetes, Hariharānanda was regularly visited by his closest student, 
Dharmamegha Āraṇya. In 1947, at the age of 78, he decided to stop maintaining 
his life and died after five days of total fasting.10 After his death his body was laid 
within the Maṭh but he forbade erecting a memorial edifice or writing any biography 
to commemorate his person.11 Dharmamegha Āraṇya, who after his master’s death 
became the leader of the aśrama, was highly appreciated by the Kāpil Maṭh devotees 
for his charismatic personality and he put effort into the translation and publication 
of some of his Bengali writings. When he died in 1985, Bhāskar Ᾱraṇya, the current 
guru born in 1942, took over the duties of leader and maintains the same lifestyle of 
austere seclusion as both his predecessors did.
What makes Kāpil Maṭh really Sāṃkhyan?
We can now consider some questions that arise when we appraise such a phenom-
enon as Kāpil Maṭh. One can doubt if it is possible at all to re-establish a philosophi-
cal tradition which has broken down and has had no succession for centuries. Can 
we respect such a lineage of self-identity declared by a modern thinker, despite the 
obvious discontinuity of the tradition he wants to identify with? And is it sufficient 
for a contemporary philosopher, who is an outstanding yogin and a knowledgeable, 
8 K.A. Jacobsen, Yoga in Modern Hinduism…, op. cit., p. 204.
9 For more details on the cave tradition see K.A. Jacobsen, In Kapila’s Cave: a Sāṁkhya-Yoga 
Renaissance in Bengal, [in:] Theory and Practice of Yoga. Essays in Honour of Gerald James Larson, 
K.A. Jacobsen (ed.), Leiden 2005, pp. 333–349.
10 Such a method of meeting death is a centuries-old Indian tradition practiced mostly in the Jain 
community.
11 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Progressive and Practical Sāṃkhya-Yoga, A. Chatterjee (ed.), Madhupur 2003, 
p. 141.
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brilliant commentator of the canonical sūtras, to proclaim the texts of a particular 
ancient tradition, like Sāṃkhyayoga, to be the expression of his own insights and 
therefore an authoritative source for the followers of the “new,” revived philosophi-
cal school identified with the “old,” or “genuine” darśana?
Before giving a negative answer to the questions above one should reflect on 
the fact that there are also some time gaps within the earlier history of Sāṃkhya, 
between its proto- and classical periods. Thus, looking at the modern revival of this 
philosophical school with suspicion, one ought to also query the continuity of the tra-
dition between Kāpila and Pañcaśikha, and between the latter and Vārṣagaṇya, and 
subsequently Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Perhaps it was the case that the subsequent Sāṃkhyayoga 
philosophers, whose names have been recorded, had to recover and re-establish this 
school numerous times by updating the old issues with their own exegetical insights, 
and thus were contributing to the tradition text, that is to the ongoing process of 
philosophy-making within a certain school.12 Each tradition text has its authoritative 
sources grounded in the oral transmission, its summaries and its ongoing written 
elaborations. The exegetical material gradually expands, refines and modifies argu-
ments, sometimes adding some new ideas, usually with increasing precision. The 
philosopher-commentator seeks to remain faithful to his sources and to bring greater 
systematic coherence, but on his own creative terms. Surely, Sāṃkhyayoga has been 
developed over centuries as an influential textual tradition. Yet, apart from some 
discrete flourishing periods there were also several longer spans of time when a few 
saṃnyāsins scattered around India were practicing some form of Sāṃkhyayoga that 
was transmitted orally. The example of the aśrama discussed here shows that tradi-
tion may be understood as a succession of “reincarnations” aiming to rediscover the 
message of Kāpila and to develop it on the Sāṃkhyayoga path through a unique 
combination of theory and practice or “practised theory.” 13
So, our initial inquiry needs to be rephrased as follows: on which grounds can 
we regard the revival of Sāṃkhyayoga, carried out by the Kāpil Maṭh founder, to be 
the opening of another period of development in this long lasting and, most likely at 
times discontinuous tradition? There are two arguments which I would like to provide 
when giving my answer: one is to argue for the Sāṃkhyayoga orthodoxy of Kāpil 
Maṭh, and another is to demonstrate the uniqueness and originality of Hariharānanda 
Ᾱraṇya’s contribution. Together they allow us to label Kāpil Maṭh as a “neo-classical” 
phase of Sāṃkhyayoga, not just as an epigonic or imitative phenomenon.
First, let us look closer at the inheritance of Kāpil Maṭh. A contemporary reinter-
pretation of the classical texts is worthy of consideration as long as it is philosophi-
cally coherent, non-sectarian, inspiring, and, above all, really Sāṃkhyan. That means 
we expect it to be in agreement with the spirit of the school and to contribute to the 
tradition text by incorporating the philosophical content of a school in a creative and 
12 E. Deutsch, Knowledge and the Tradition Text in Indian Philosophy, [in:] Interpreting Across 
Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, G.J. Larson, E. Deutsch (eds.), Delhi 1989, 
pp. 165–173.
13 M. Jakubczak, op. cit., p. 37.
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consistent way.14 Naturally, we cannot make the definition of “the Sāṃkhya spirit” 
too narrow or too rigid, as the tradition has been interpreting and re-interpreting 
itself over the ages. Nonetheless, if one wants to attribute the Sāṃkhyan core to 
a worldview or to detect the philosophical perspective typical of this school, there 
are some crucial assumptions we should examine. The points that define the unique 
identity of Sāṃkhya are captured in its classical period, codified by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in 
his Sāṃkhyakārikā. Let us start with the four rudimental claims. First and foremost, 
to think in the “Sāṃkhyan way” one needs to assert the ultimate dualism between the 
objective and subjective realm: discrimination between the self (puruṣa) – being 
the principle of consciousness – versus the unconscious and spontaneously crea-
tive nature (prakṛti), is considered crucial and effective for liberation (mokṣa) from 
worldly suffering. The second key assumption is the recognition of the 25 principles, 
or categories of reality (tattvas), and the distinction between the evolvent and the 
evolute of nature (prakṛti–vikāra). Thirdly, the recognition of three constituents of 
nature (guṇas), or the substantive “threads” of objective reality, which account for: 
pleasure, thinking and clarity (sattva); craving, activity and attachment (rajas); and 
depression, restraint and delusion (tamas). Fourthly, emphasis on egotism (asmitā) 
and misattribution of the self (ahaṃkāra) as the basic manifestation of fivefold igno-
rance (avidyā), the root of all suffering.
The list of crucial assumptions and claims may be extended, of course, but here 
it is interesting to refer to the Sāṃkhyayoga teachings as they are summarized by 
Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya himself. Apart from acceptance of the authority of Kāpila, 
he captures the core of Sāṃkhya doctrine in twelve points: (1) liberation (mokṣa) 
consists in the complete cessation of all suffering; (2) on attainment of liberation one 
abides in one’s immutable and attributeless self (puruṣa); (3) in the state of liberation, 
the mind (citta) returns to its original cause (i.e. prakṛti); (4) cessation of the mind 
can be brought about by renunciation and supreme knowledge acquired through con-
centration (samādhi); (5) concentration is attainable by observance of the prescribed 
codes of conduct and practice of meditation; (6) liberation brings about cessation of 
the cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra); (7) this cycle is without a beginning and is the result 
of latent impressions (saṃskāra, vāsanā) left by our physical and mental activities 
(karman); (8) nature (prakṛti) and the countless selves (puruṣas) are respectively 
the constituent and efficient causes of the creation; (9) prakṛti and puruṣa are non-
created realities with neither beginning nor an end; (10) īśvara is the eternally free 
self; (11) īśvara has nothing to do with the creation of the universe or life; (12) the 
lord of the universe is demiurge, called Prajāpati or Hiraṇyagarbha, and the whole 
universe is being held and sustained by him.15
As we can see, Hariharānanda makes it clear that yoga is primarily a philosophical 
teaching which needs to be complemented with renunciation, which is a prerequisite 
for every serious practitioner of yoga discipline. His idea of the living Sāṃkhyayoga 
14 Cf. D. Krishna, Is Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṁkhya-Kārikā Really Sāṁkhyan?, [in:] idem, Indian Philoso-
phy. A Counter Perspective, New Delhi 1996, p. 146. Also, E. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 169–170.
15 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali…, op. cit., p. xxv.
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tradition contrasts sharply with modern postural yoga institutions which promote 
bodily practice to influence and improve mental and physical health.
Comparative perspective of Hariharānanda
The writings left by the founder of Kāpil Maṭh are original, thorough, and consistent. 
Although he uses philosophical Sanskrit vocabulary quite freely, citing from a variety 
of Indian sources, Ᾱraṇya’s interpretations are coherent, based on profound scholar-
ship and formulated clearly from the classical Sāṃkhyayoga perspective which is, as 
he says, “logical and systematic right through.”16
In his Karmatattva, a comprehensive elucidation of the Sāṃkhyayoga theory 
of action, the Bengali ascetic tries to apply an inter-cultural comparative perspec-
tive, referring frequently to Western philosophical thought, both ancient and modern, 
and also making numerous remarks on the findings and popular theories of the late 
nineteenth-century science right up to the 1930s.17 He mainly cites or comments 
on physical chemistry, biology, materialist theories in modern physics, evolutionism 
and Darwinism. Hariharānanda refers to such authors as Ernst Haeckel (Riddle of 
the Universe, 1900), James Hopwood Jeans (The Universe around Us, 1929), Oliver 
Lodge (Life and Matter, 1905), William H. Conn (The Story of the Living Machine, 
1899), John B. Burke (The Origin of Life, Its Physical Basis and Definition, 1906), 
and Arthur S. Eddington (The Nature of the Physical World, 1928). The most influ-
ential among them was, probably, Haeckel, a German adherent of Darwin and an 
outstanding biologist, physician, philosopher and artist who discovered and named 
thousands of new species, and who coined many terms in biology, including “anthro-
pogeny,” “ecology,” “stem cell,” and “Protista.” Ᾱraṇya must have also been inspired 
by James H. Jeans, an English physicist and mathematician known for his popular 
books about astronomy. He was the first to propose the continuous-creation theory: 
claiming that matter is continuously created throughout the universe. Darwinism, 
which seemed to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya to be in tune with the Sāṃkhyayoga vision 
of spontaneous evolution of nature (prakṛti parināma), originally gained scientific 
acceptance after Charles Darwin published his On the Origin of Species (1859), but 
later in the mid-twentieth century became a synonym of a simplified theory, and has 
been used within the scientific community only to distinguish the modern evolu-
tionary synthesis, sometimes called “Neo-Darwinism,” from the outdated theory of 
Darwin himself. Thus, nowadays, Darwinist terminology in the comparative remarks 
of Hariharānanda does not imply the same up-to-date and intellectually attractive 
connotations as it did in his life-time.
Yet in the comparative studies of the Kāpil Maṭh founder the main focus is on 
intra-Indian discourse. His argument, inspired by a sort of pan-Indian universalism,18 
16 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Sāṃkhya Across the Millenniums, A. Chatterjee (ed.), Madhupur 2005, p. v.
17 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, The Doctrine of Karma…, op. cit., pp. 1–58.
18 The comments on Ᾱraṇya’s life story and his idea of pan-Indian universalism are partly repeated 
after: M. Jakubczak, op. cit., pp. 31–33.
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is not devoid of syncretism and remains open to criticism, either from the perspective 
of the idealistic Vedānta or the theistic currents of Indian philosophy. First of all, he 
strongly believes that the philosophical positions of Sāṃkhyayoga and early Bud-
dhism have much more in common than was conventionally acknowledged, arguing 
that “they are the branches of the same tree, nourished by the same roots.” Like the 
orthodox Hindu traditions respecting the authority of Vedas (āstika darśanas), het-
erodox Buddhism belongs to the tradition of the sages (ṛṣis) called ārṣa dharma, or 
ārṣaism, inaccurately termed “Brahmanism.”19 As Hariharānanda puts it, the lineage 
of the sages was broadly divided into two currents: one, called pravṛtti dharma (the 
creed of worldliness), preached and practised the performance of religious rites lead-
ing to worldly happiness, while the other, called nivṛtti dharma (the creed of renun-
ciation), propounded the path of liberation from all worldly conditioning. The latter, 
of which Paramaṛṣi Kāpila was known to be the greatest exponent, owed its origin to 
those ṛṣis who had discovered the way to self-realisation and developed from their 
own spiritual experience a complete system of theory and practice for guiding others 
along that path towards liberation from the cycle of rebirth.20
Attainment of the ultimate aim of the creed of worldliness (pravṛtti dharma) in-
volves the worship of God or saints, the practice of virtues along with the perfor-
mance of good deeds (puṇya) and proper rituals (yajña). The creed of renunciation, 
on the other hand, points out that the ultimate aim of liberation from saṃsāra can be 
achieved only through a complete knowledge of one’s true self. In his introduction 
to a translation of the Dhammapada, an early Buddhist text, Ᾱraṇya believes that 
the majority of mankind can only follow the creed of worldliness by practising good 
deeds, which he calls “the lower rungs of the great ladder,” which leads to “blowing 
out” (nirvāṇa).21 As he emphasises, in this matter there is no difference between the 
Buddhists and the ārṣas because both may promote either nivṛtti or pravṛtti dharma 
aspirations. Thus argues for a kind of pan-Indian universalism which challenges such 
entrenched categories as heterodox versus orthodox (nāstika/āstika), accepting the 
doctrine of the self versus no-self (ātman/anatman) or believing in god versus re-
jecting god (seśvaravāda/nirīśvaravāda). Yet, the only crucial distinction we should 
never overlook when describing a particular philosopher or school is the one between 
pravṛtti and nivṛtti. What Hariharānanda emphasises above all is the uniqueness of 
human endeavour aiming at self-knowledge-through-renunciation and describes it as 
a very narrow current within the multiple and disparate philosophical traditions of 
India. As he ironically or just realistically observes, every genuine spiritual tradition 
focused on renunciation cannot continue unbroken for a long time. Each philosophi-
cal school or yogic monastery of this kind, he predicts, can function properly and 
stick closely to its founder’s recommendations for a generation or two, after which ir-
regularities creep in and various sects and fractions arise.22 Interestingly, even though 
he considers the stability and durability of transmission of the creed of renunciation to 
19 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Progressive and Practical Sāṃkhya-Yoga…, op. cit., p. 22.
20 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali…, op. cit., pp. xxi–xxv.
21 S.H. Ᾱraṇya, Progressive and Practical Sāṃkhya-Yoga…, op. cit., p. 22.
22 Ibidem, p. 21.
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be extremely fragile, Ᾱraṇya had no doubt about its eternal, universal accessibility to 
highly motivated and persistent seekers, no matter the time or the place, or from which 
religious tradition or philosophical school they come. According to his successor’s ac-
count, Swāmi Hariharānanda maintained that yogic lore encouraging self-knowledge, 
unlike any physical science or other branch of knowledge, has not evolved over time 
or, in other words, undergoes no substantial historical development.23
A hybrid identity of the living Sāṃkhyayoga tradition
A close connection between the Sāṃkhya and Buddhist ideals is openly declared by 
Kāpil Maṭh members.24 Hariharānanda maintains that there are undeniable affinities 
between Buddhism and Sāṃkhyayoga, and that the Buddha’s teachings were pro-
foundly influenced by the ancient doctrine of Sāṃkhya, as transmitted to the Buddha 
through Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka. The current guru, Bhāskar Ᾱraṇya, in his public 
talks calls the Buddha the most accomplished philosopher within the whole Sāṃkhya 
tradition and the most outstanding of all Kāpila’s disciples. On the other hand, it is no 
secret that the Buddha favoured the doctrine of no-self (anātman). His criticism of 
the concept of the permanent unchanging self (puruṣa) accepted by Sāṃkhya, how-
ever, does not diminish the close relationship between these comparable traditions. 
As Hariharānanda assumes, his own in-depth reading of the Sāṃkhyayoga and Bud-
dhist core texts can go beyond the seeming contradictions between both conceptions. 
Moreover, he offers a new perspective showing that the living Sāṃkhya tradition can 
benefit from the Buddhist challenge and gain a new, more precise, formulation of 
its classical position. To see how this is achieved, let us trace a few Buddhist coun-
ter arguments and the ways in which they may be addressed from the neoclassical 
Sāṃkhyayoga perspective.
As we learn from Aśvaghoṣa’s famous Sanskrit poem Buddhacarita (1st or 2nd 
century CE), Siddhārtha Gautama (to become the Buddha) was first inspired but then 
disappointed with the philosophical teachings of Ārāḍa Kālāma, a popular Sāṃkhya 
yogin of his time, who was believed to have gained insight into absolute bliss.25 In 
Buddhacarita 12.69–88, the Buddha claims that the self – declared to be eternal and 
pure – is the causal root for continued existence and rebirth. So the very concept of 
the self is recognised as a hindrance on the path to ultimate liberation from all suf-
fering. Therefore, he rejects this concept by discrediting its Sāṃkhyan definition, 
23 S.A. Dharmamegha, So Have We Heard (Iti Śuśruma), trans. I. Gupta, Kolkata 2003, p. 148.
24 Until recently connections between Sāṃkhya philosophy and Buddhism have been under-
researched but, fortunately, more and more scholars have undertaken this topic. For instance, Ferenz 
Ruzsa, summing up his original interpretation of Sāṃkhya dualist position, persuades that the Buddha 
inherited his substance-reductionist ideas from the proto-Sāṃkhya circles of Āruṇi and Yājñavalkya. Cf. 
F. Ruzsa, Sāṁkhya: Dualism without Substances, [in:] Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics, J. Tuske 
(ed.), New York 2019, pp. 153–181.
25 Cf. “Ariyapariyesana Sutta,” Majjhima Nikāya 26 (In the Buddha’s Words: An Anthology of 
Discourses from the Pāli Canon, Bhikku Bodhi (ed.), Somerville 2005, p. 72). Also see: Life of the 
Buddha by Aśvaghoṣa, trans. P. Olivelle, New York 2008, pp. 322–323.
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which is as follows: the true self, being eternal and contentless, by no means can be 
objectified, even by or for itself. First, Siddhārtha undermines the permanence of the 
self, noting that as long as there is a knower, there is something for him to know, and 
since there is something for him to know, he can never be released (Buddhacarita 
12.80). The early Sāṃkhya philosopher could readily refute such criticism by stating 
that to capture the meaning of ‘self’ one must distinguish between the upper self – be-
ing true and pure consciousness, transcendent to nature (prakṛti), but also absolutely 
passive, not involved in the process of knowing ordoing – and, on the other hand, 
the lower embodied self, or empirical “I,” that is the psycho-physical organism fully 
engaged in all mental and bodily activities. In the subsequent passage of the Bud-
dhicarita, Siddhārtha seems to anticipate this possible Sāṃkhya defence by asking 
ironically: if the “field knower” (kṣetrajña) can also refer to the one who is actually 
not a knower, as a non-engaged transcendent self, then why should we call this not-
knowing self “the self,” after all? Such a strong concept of the self (puruṣa/ātman ) 
sounds to him inconsistent and simply invented, so he mocks it by stating that one 
can easily do without the self, since “absence of knowing exists in a log or a wall” 
(Buddhacarita 12.81). Bodhisattva clearly rejects a distinction between the upper 
and the lower self for one further reason. He asserts that removing the imperfections 
of the self by abandoning all desire and ignorance cannot be successfully realised 
as long as one keeps identifying oneself with the self – no matter upper or lower – 
and upholds its everlasting existence (Buddhacarita 12.73). While Ārāḍa, the early 
Sāṃkhya teacher, assumes eradication of the I-sense (ahaṃkāra), together with the 
egotism it causes, to be the crucial prerequisite for achieving the ultimate meditative 
absorption and liberation, Siddhārtha doubts if the ego may really be abandoned un-
less belief in the permanent self has been completely given up (Buddhacarita 12.76).26
Thus, what makes the pure self inevitable for the Sāṃkhyayoga conception of 
human nature, since – as a Buddhist opponent suggests – every psycho-physical 
function may be accounted for by the transient empirical self, called antaḥkaraṇa in 
Sāṃkhyakārikā or citta in Patañjalayogaśāstra? What is this concept good for, and 
why is it worth upholding, despite all the criticism directed at the Sāṃkhyayoga idea 
of subjectivity? Why should a metaphysical claim about the existence of a permanent, 
immutable, and inactive subjective being be favoured over the view that everything, 
including the self, undergoes continuous change, which is just a continuum of de-
pendently originated events and phenomena? 27
While specifying the rationale for the absolute self, the principle of consciousness, 
one cannot forget the ultimate purpose of any cognition or meditative insight, but 
also the conceptual view following the act of directly acquired knowledge. Any view 
worth maintaining is to be useful and beneficial for achieving liberation. Therefore, 
the Sāṃkhya belief that whatever happens in the realm of saṃsāra is for the sake 
26 In the later Buddhist tradition especially in the Abhidharma texts, we can find more arguments 
against Sāṃkhya metaphysics. Cf. J. Bronkhorst, Sāṃkhya in the Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya, “Journal of 
Indian Philosophy” 1997, vol. 25, pp. 393–400.
27 On the possible defense of the Sāṃkhyan self, reinterpreted in Buddhist terms and to some degree 
inspired by the position of Swāmi Hariharānanda, I wrote in: M. Jakubczak, op. cit., pp. 29–45.
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of the self, including the discriminative knowledge (vivekakhyāti) of the known ver-
sus the knower,28 must be of some use for the ultimate enterprise, namely achieving 
liberation (mokṣa).
Conclusion
When reconsidering the fundamentals of Sāṃkhyayoga philosophy, especially the 
conception of the self, in the light of the comparative remarks of Hariharānanda 
Ᾱraṇya and his followers, we can see that they do not only aim at defending their 
doctrine against criticism of other Hindu and Buddhist philosophers, but make every 
effort to reinterpret it creatively, addressing some of the counterarguments as well 
as the advances of contemporary natural science. What is also significant is that 
they do not mind using vipassanā, which is the unbroken lineage of the Buddhist 
meditative practice, to their advantage.29 Apparently, neoclassical Sāṃkhyayoga can 
benefit from Buddhist critiques. Its way of dealing with the alternative conception 
of the self, proposed by the Buddha, seems to be in line with the general Indian 
agenda of cultural adaptation and assimilation: a rival Buddhist view is not rejected 
or dismissed right away, but is rather mitigated by reinterpreting it according to one’s 
own perspective, and it is also used to better formulate, rephrase and re-evaluate the 
Sāṃkhyan conception of the self. 30
Thus the revived Sāṃkhyayoga’s spirit can persist, despite an obvious historical 
discontinuity, but also gain a new hybrid identity thanks to embracing some supple-
mentary assumptions. First, Buddhism as such is considered to be a re-establishment 
of Kāpila’s tradition. That is why the Buddha’a conception of no-self (anātman) is 
not perceived as being totally opposed to Sāṃkhya’s position, but rather as a radi-
cal exposition of the universal self-knowledge that may be articulated differently 
and more adequately in terms of neoclassical Sāṃkhyayoga. Second, the fact that 
the canonical Buddhist texts contain references to a supposed Sāṃkhya teacher, the 
hermit Ārāḍa Kālāma,31 who was abandoned by Siddhārtha Gautama after mastering 
his teachings, does not prove the Buddha’s total rejection of the Sāṃkhya path, but 
rather testifies to his high motivation for attaining self-knowledge through direct 
28 Sāṃkhyakārikā 2 defines liberating insight (vivekakhyāti) as recognizing a distinction between the 
manifest (vyakta) and the unmanifest (avyakta), and the knower (jña), i.e. the self (puruṣa).
29 When I visited aśrama for the first time in 2010, there were two monks including Ṛtaprakāśa 
Ᾱraṇya, the younger one who was the chief editor of their journal Sāṃkhyayāna. When asked about 
the practical method helpful for the Sāṃkhyayoga monks in realising their philosophical and spiritual 
purpose, Swāmi Ṛtaprakāśa Ᾱraṇya pointed to the vipassanā technique (i.e. meditative insight into 
impermanence) as it is taught nowadays at the Vipassanā Meditation Centres initiated by Satya Narayan 
Goenka, who mastered it under the guidance of his Burmese teacher U Ba Khin.
30 The assumptions of this rephrased neoclassical Sāṃkhyan conception of the self I discussed in 
more detail in: M. Jakubczak, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
31 Apart from abovementioned episode of the Buddha’s life recorded by Aśvaghoṣa in Buddhacarita, 
which refers to Ārāḍa Kālāma (cf. M. Jakubczak, op. cit), also in the Pāli canon the Buddha makes 
a passing remark upon Ᾱḷāra Kālāma (cf. the sutta on The Noble Search – Ariyapariyesana Sutta, Ma-
jjhima Nikāya 26). Cf. B. Bodhi (ed.), op. cit.
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insight, which he valued higher than any verbal testimony. Third, a textual reference 
to Ārāḍa’s and Udraka’s meditative achievements when describing the multi-stage 
process of meditation shows that the Buddha followed his teachers’ footsteps, al-
though he contributed some essential innovations to the method used by his pre-
decessors. Fourth, even though the Buddha rejects certain assumptions of the early 
Sāṃkhya metaphysics and further develops its meditation technique, elevating the 
new concept of vipassanā32 (i.e. insight and thorough penetration of an object), he 
integrates it with a pre-Buddhist yogic system of dhyāna (Pāli jhāna), based on the 
śamatha method of meditation,33 which allows to achieve a well-balanced, tranquil 
state of mind. This invention of the Buddha does not violate the Sāṃkhyayoga theory 
of self-development, and was successfully adjusted and fitted into its own methodol-
ogy, at least in Patañjalayogadarśana.34 Studying the phenomenon of Kāpil Maṭh, 
a contemporary example of the Sāṃkhyayoga living tradition, we can learn how 
the spirit of innovation and fidelity to tradition interact to produce another hybrid 
identity which can be labelled as the quasi-Buddhist orthopraxy synthesised with the 
Sāṃkhyan orthodoxy. 35
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